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Abstract 
 
This article reviews the effectiveness of seed aid distributions in Kenya during the 1990s.  It 
analyses the internal process and effects, i.e.  the performance of the aid itself  as well as the 
external process and effects, i.e. how seed-aid intervention affected farmers’ broader agricultural 
management strategies. During the drought emergency of 1997,  Kenyan farmers favorably 
judged many of the  immediate seed aid features such as crop/variety  appropriateness  and seed 
quality---even through the overarching goals of the seed assistance were muddled,  ranging from  
assistance to the poor,  to generalized gift-giving to stimulating progressive farming practice. 
However, the longer-term analyses, drawn from  recollections  of a  decade of relief activity , 
showed no concrete evidence that seed aid, per se, had strengthened their farmer systems, nor that 
those who have received it once were less likely to receive it again.  Thus, while seed aid has 
been promoted to  lessen the effects of   an ‘acute’ stress , drought,  Kenyan farmers, in practice, 
have been experiencing much wider, ‘chronic’ seed system problems.  This article ends by  
exploring  this distinction between acute and chronic seed system stress and suggests a  range of  
interventions appropriate to each. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Every country in the East and Central Africa  has witnessed drought, civil disturbance, or both 
within the last 10 years, with many regions having experienced such disruptions on a near 
continuous basis (for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and northern 
Rwanda.) One response this to  instability has been the  increasing and  even constant delivery of 
seed aid to the region. Although ‘seed and tools’ is  a relatively new assistance approach 
(probably first- implemented around 1990) (ODI, 1996), The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) estimates that, by the mid-1990s, upwards of $10 million per year was being spent in this 
Greater Horn of Africa area  —just for the procurement of seed for emergency projects 
(Chemonics, 1996).   
 
Context 
 
Kenya is no exception to this aid-recipient trend and  droughts of the last decade  (eg 1991-2, 
1994, 1996-7, 1998-9)  have resulted in  repeated  and widespread distributions of  emergency 
seed. Since 1993, when the Government’s Emergency Drought Recovery Programme (EDRP)  
was formed to address drought issues in arid and semi-arid areas, seed-aid has been delivered  on 
a yearly basis across a broad range of Kenyan sites.  The focus has been heavily on maize seed  
distribution , across agro-ecological regions and through the years.   
 2
 
Seed aid  may be  rather ‘new’ to Kenya, but  the phenomenon of  drought is not  One specialist 
describes 18 significant droughts in the century between 1883 and 1984—about one every 5 1/2 
years (Downing et al. 1989). Most evidently, drought is related to fluctuations in weather patterns 
and, subsequent local water availability. Equally important is that this ‘lack’ of water  is linked to 
the spatial and temporal  resources that communities can  access. (Sandford 1979) Landholdings 
in Kenya have steadily decreased over the last 30 years,  with per capita income dropping from 
$400 in 1963 to $US 280 in 1999 (Mwangi, 2000). Drought, or its acute effects, are becoming 
more common because farming systems, and particularly poorer farm holdings, are increasingly 
less resilient ---with less land, fewer crops, and less, little, or no surplus to store. 
 
 
 
Aims and structure 
 
This article  draws from a consultancy report  which reviewed  the effectiveness of  seed aid 
distribution  in Kenya.  The immediate emphasis was on aid delivered during the Long Rains 
1997 (February to June)i, but it also gained insight from the decade-long  history of recurrent 
emergency seed assistance.     
 
The article starts by describing the methodology used and then divides the next section,  
‘Findings’, into two  distinct parts.  One examines the internal process and effects of seed aid 
delivered during the Long Rains 1997; a  subsequent analysis reflects on the external process and 
effects: 
 
Internal process and effects refers to issues such as the appropriateness of the crops and 
varieties distributed, the timing of delivery and the targeting of seed-aid recipients. It 
closely relates to the overall design and implementation of the aid program. 
 
 External process and effects examines how the seed-aid intervention affected farmers’ 
 broader agricultural management strategies and whether it helped farmers get back on 
 their feet.  The analysis goes beyond specific aid program objectives to address wider 
 system  sustainability impacts. 
 
This article ends by  exploring  the distinction between acute and chronic seed system stress, and 
the range of interventions which  may be appropriate to each.  This concluding section  was  
specifically triggered by the case study’s substantive findings.   When the consultancy  was first 
commissioned , ‘the problem’ was presented as an acute one: Kenyan farmers had suffered from 
the effects of drought in the season prior to 1997 and needed seed to sow when rains next  fell.   
However, as the work unfolded, using government documents and perspectives (top-down 
overviews) and drawing on valuable farmer insights (bottom up), it became clear that the drought 
situation was not a once-off affair. It was not a discrete, acute disaster situation. During the last 
decade, many Kenyan farmers had suffered the  effects of droughts on a repeated basis and  their 
seed system problems have developed as more chronic ones.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The heart of the report builds on extensive interviews with beneficiaries,  and local aid 
implementers. Some 172 farmer interviews were conducted at  four main sites where seed was 
distributed during 1997: Machakos, Baringo, Makueni, Embu/Mbeere.  (A fifth site, Thika, 
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yielded a smaller number of  ‘pre-test’ insights).  Interviews elicited both in-depth qualitative  
reflections as well as quantitative assessments relating to such issues as seed sown and  yields 
obtained.   Farmer selection was done randomly: every 3rd to 5th house (depending on residential 
density) in zones of blanket  distribution, or off recipient lists where there was more restricted 
distribution. Farmer testimonies were complemented by written project documentation and  
interviews among seed-aid managers and planners at various levels of field operation (eg the 
Government of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Office of the President, Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI), and  non-governmental organization staff). 
 
All sites were located in small farmer areas and  characterized by low, sporadic rainfall (600-950 
mm) and, at all,  those implementing the aid (government, NGO and church staff)  were keen for 
the self-reflection which case analysis might bring.  The Government Ministry of  Agriculture 
managed the seed aid  in Machakos and Baringo, distributing  maize and beans in both, and 
adding to the Baringo aid package some high quality vegetable seeds (onions, cabbage and 
tomatoes) as farmers targeted  had access to irrigated plots.   The other two sites were Church/ 
NGO implemented.  In Mbeere/Embu, the Diocese , with financial and some technical support 
from  Catholic Relief Services (CRS), distributed seed aid of maize, beans as well as sorghum, 
millet and cowpeas. In Makueni,  a prior development program started by German Agro Action- 
(GAA) in 1995, turned into an emergency operation.  Since GAA’s overall  aim was to maintain 
nutritional standards by diversifying crops and improving methods of local seed production,  they 
gave an  array of seed  (beans, sorghum, millet, cowpea, pigeon pea, green gram )  and trained 
communities in group organization and techniques of  seed production.  
 
.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
The internal process and effects of seed aid 
 
An ‘internal’ type of analysis is the kind  most often programmed as  follow-up  by  key aid 
givers, i.e. . governments (see, for example, Anon. 1997) or implementing NGOs  (e.g., 
CRS/Kenya-DRI 1997). Taking place shortly after implementation (during the planting season or 
just after harvest), this ‘internal evaluation’ explores questions of crop and variety choice, 
logistical procedures (timing and methods of distribution), adequacy of amounts given, and 
beneficiary targeting. Internal evaluations may be used to improve the process of giving seed aid 
in future delivery periods, once the decision has been made to embark upon a seed-and-tools 
program. 
 
Most farmers  assessed the ‘product-associated variables’ quite favorably in the 1997 distribution.  
They deemed the type of crops and varieties  (basically improved varieties of  maize and beans) 
as appropriate , with the more drought-tolerant crops also deemed ‘acceptable’—as long as maize 
was  one of the elements included in the aid package.  Farmers also remarked on the high  quality 
and germination properties of the seed. Simply, most have not used certified seed—or only when 
given it free.  The case of  the maize distribution is somewhat special ,  as it consisted primarily 
of hybrids (the 500 series and 600 series) with some delivery of the composite variety Katumani,.  
Poorer Kenyan farmers do not routinely use maize hybrids (except in Baringo)ii,  and they were 
impressed with its  ‘specialness’ and even ‘luxury value’, but not necessarily just for direct 
sowing. Farmers can exchange the packaged maize for urgently needed items (e.g. food staples 
such as salt, sugar, and oil). Seed aid in this sense achieves a ‘currency’ function.  
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How did these farmers' subjective assessments of the appropriateness of seed  ‘product’  inputs 
compare with their actual practices?  According to farmer testimony, the great majority of the aid 
seed was sown—across crops and across locations. For instance, 85% of farmers sowed all 
(100%) of the maize seed received, while 72% of those receiving cowpea sowed all (100%). 
Further,  83%  of those who received sorghum seed sowed at least half of that aid given. 
The relatively lower proportion of sorghum and cowpea sown reflects farmers' secondary 
preference for this crop, although by absolute standards, the percentages sown indicate positive 
interest.  
 
It was in terms of all  the ‘process-associated variables’—all three—that farmers universally 
expressed strong discontent:  the timing  of distribution was late in relation to critical planting 
dates, the  targeting not transparent, and quantities of seed received  were just ‘too little’. The less 
rigorous targeting was directly related to lesser quantities received per farmer. Overall, the 
process variables were rated higher at a single site where a prior assistance/development program 
had been established (the site of GAA). 
 
While seed arriving late is a common complaint across seed-aid interventions, in Kenya 1997, the 
process was given an unusually late start due to the delay in announcing an official emergency, at 
the end of January 1997 (CRS-Kenya/DRI 1997). Funds for seed purchase and transport cannot 
be raised until an official emergency has been  declared. Only GAA in Makueni, which had a 
prior seed-assistance program on site, was able to deliver most of their aid punctually. 
 
Across sites, the farmers’ biggest complaint about the maize received was the small quantity, with 
discontent highest at Machakos, where a generalized, untargeted, government distribution took 
place. There, a cluster of farmers received almost nothing (0.1, 0.2, 0.25 kg). There may be costs 
of targeting well  (the technical costs of learning which farmers need seed, as well as the political 
and social costs of ‘not giving to all’) (see also Archibald and Richards, this volume). However, 
there are also substantial—and direct—costs to not targeting. Those most in need may receive 
only token help, and not enough to spur  on  their agricultural viability. 
 
 
Internal process and effects: two burning issues 
 
Goals of seed aid 
 
The goals of giving seed aid  were neither similar—nor transparent--- among the four cases 
analyzed.   This was evident on several levels.  Project documents were generally vague about 
goals  (with the exception of GAA’s) --  stating  simply  that seed aid was being given to ensure 
that farmers had something to plant.  Second, the government distributions used different design  
principles in the two sites examined (although public rhetoric is that all Kenyan citizens deserve 
the same—or ‘equal’); Third, communities were unable to distinguish among the different agency 
rationale for aid gifts, with some households having received two or three seed packages the same 
season—but from different sources. 
 
Based on analysis of practice, there seem to have been at least four different goals. Seed was 
given: 
 
-- to fill a temporary seed gap—for the farmer to have something to plant 
This was most evident in the Embu/Mbeere case, where a variety of crops were 
given (including some of the more drought-tolerant) and where those receiving aid 
were generally among the poorer farmers (i.e. receiving aid from the church). 
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--  to encourage self-help, or for farmers to achieve a self-sustaining seed-production 
strategy 
This was clearest in the Makueni case, where farmers received training in improved 
seed-production techniques, were organized into collaborative groups, and were also 
encouraged to put more emphasis on drought-tolerant crops. 
 
--  to give a gift to constituency—political combined with farming goals 
Machakos is the type case here. Farmers’ standard crops—maize and beans—were 
given as seed to all who turned up, although the certified maize seed was an extra 
bonus for many. Complete lack of targeting resulted in relatively small quantities of 
seed received per person (but encouraged broad support for ruling government 
party—who organized the aid) 
 
--  to stimulate ‘progressive’ modern farming practices 
The Baringo seed distribution illustrates this goal. Progressive farmers—those with 
precious irrigated plots-- were targeted with hybrid maize and income-generating 
vegetable seeds. 
 
 
None of these goals is inherently negative, although the first two probably more closely parallel 
the goals aspired to emergency stress situations. However, the multitude of goals, and 
accompanying approaches, created confusion among the general population about what seed aid 
is for, and perhaps created false expectations as well as unnecessary, even routine, 
dependencies—as exemplified in the following farmer statements. 
 
Embu: “Seed relief aid should be given throughout the year [i.e., every season], whether during 
emergency periods or normal periods, because there are some farmers who have enough 
land but can't make use of it because of financial problems. The most serious problem is 
the high price of seeds [an access problem].” [interview No. 4] 
 
“It is very difficult to get seeds from the local market or any other place because of the 
prices—so seed relief should be encouraged more.” [interview No. 7] 
 
Minimally, the goals of a seed-aid operation should be clear  to all (donor, implementer, farmer) 
and should be matched with an active strategy to reach those goals. In the current Kenyan 
situation, we seem to have hidden goals and multiple (even conflicting) expectations.   
 
 
Targeting 
 
A confusion of goals necessarily translates into a muddled targeting situation, although it is 
difficult to say which factor  precedes the other. Without a definition of goals beforehand, it is 
hard to judge the effectiveness of subsequent targeting. 
 
Among the four sites visited, several targeting strategies were noted (Table 1). Programs such as 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s (MOA) distribution in Machakos achieved zonal targeting: i.e., 
everyone in the zone received aid (known as ‘blanket distribution’ or ‘equi-distribution’). In the 
other areas, attempts were made to target specific groups within zones. This encompassed the 
more vulnerable in both the Church/CRS-sponsored distribution of Embu/Mbeere and the GAA-
sponsored seed program in Makueni, while the MOA-sponsored program of Baringo seemed to 
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target the more progressive farmers (those with ‘exemplary farming practices’). The Church 
sample had the additional targeting criteria of reaching Catholics. This may have been an 
outcome rather than an explicit strategy, as prayer houses proved to be the major channels of 
dissemination. 
 
 
Table 1: Farmer-perceived criteria for those who received seed aid in 1997— 
                 distinctive features 
Makueni Embu/Mbeere Machakos Baringo 
* Seed for Work 
 
* Groups trained and 
given seed (self-help) 
 
* Those belonging to 
organized farmer 
groups/ women’s 
groups 
 
* Only Catholics 
 
* Anyone who presented 
himself/ herself at Church 
 
* Small fee charged per kilo. 
Then those who went to church 
and paid—received 
 
* List written down. It included 
Catholics and non-Catholics 
 
*Through Church Committee 
* all who went to 
chief's baraza 
[meeting]/all who 
turned up/all who 
went to agricultural 
extension meeting 
 
* All were given 
 
* Farmers ready to 
plant—because seed 
came late 
* Farmers who 
adopted techniques 
of extension staff 
 
* Extension agents 
chose 
 
*Best farmers: “If 
she prepared her 
farm well, she got 
more” 
 
 
What is clear within the Kenyan context is that lack of  transparent and  well-articulated goals on 
the part of the donor and  project managers is creating significant friction among those who 
dispense the seed and among many of the recipients. There were repeated accounts of the some of 
the poorest farmers receiving insignificant amounts. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority 
(95% of those interviewed) indicated that the seed aid was simply “too little.” This statement 
could also be interpreted as a sign of the increasing dependency and expectations of farmers on 
outside, ‘free’ support. 
 
The targeting scenario posed in this Kenya study should be one of the easier ones as populations 
are physically stable (compared to refugees on the move) and have lived in their home areas for at 
least several seasons (so have some idea of each others’ relative wealth levels). Some further  
parameters would need to be addressed to get more focused delivery: how to define seed-
vulnerable populations in an emergency situation (i.e.  those who neither have seed nor the means 
to access it) , and then how to distinguish those who are experiencing acute seed stress (that is, 
stress just this season, due to e.g. drought) from those who are chronically seed insecure (and 
require outside help nearly every season).  
 
However, many of the challenges in remedying targeting concerns are political and/or social.  In   
general public distribution places (such as government-called community meetings), populations 
have been given the sense that seed aid is their right as Kenyan citizens and that all should benefit 
from government gifts. 
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External process and effects of seed aid:  
 
 
An ‘external’ assessment looks at  the effectiveness of aid delivered  in the context of farmers’ 
broader agricultural-management strategies. It examines whether the seed aid given helped 
farmers “get back on their feet”. To arrive at this longer-term perspective, farmers’ history of 
seed aid has been  briefly reviewed and its relative importance among farmers’  other seed-
procurement strategies is assessed during emergency and more normal agricultural periods. 
 
Between  1992 and 1997, on average, each family interviewed had received seed aid twice, with a 
high of 10 times. (Table 2)  Most farmers, irrespective of wealth, had received seed aid more than 
once in the last decade. Those in the ‘church sample’ (Embu/Mbeere), who correlated more with 
poorer segments, received seed aid once in about every two to three  seasons. Farmer comments 
suggest that many have come to expect ‘emergency’ aid on a continued basis. 
 
Table 2:  Number of times  Kenyan farmers have received seed aid 1992-1997 
 
Region 
 
Average 
 
Mode 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 
Machakos   
(N=46) 
 
1.8 
 
2 
 
 4 
 
0 
 
Baringo 
(N=46)  
 
1.4 
 
1 
 
 3 
 
0 
 
Makueni 
(N=33) 
 
2.2 
 
1 
 
 5 
 
1 
 
Embu/Mbeere 
(N=40) 
 
3.1 
 
4 / 3 
 
10 
 
1 
 
Thika  
(N=7) 
 
  3   
 
3 
 
 5 
 
2 
 
OVERALL  
(N=172) 
 
2.1 
 
2 / 1 
 
10 
 
0 
 
 
For the specific season of Long Rains 1997, seed aid of maize, which was the lion’s share of aid 
given, provided 14% of the total quantity of maize sown , while for beans, seed aid represented 
11% of the total seed sown. The situation for sorghum and cowpea was slightly different because 
aid agencies most often gave these crops expressly to diversify farmers’ crop profiles in more 
drought-prone areas  (That is, farmers did not routinely sow such ‘novel’ crops) . Seed aid  for 
these minority crops accounted for 33% and 27% of the total seed sown for sorghum and cowpea, 
respectively. Thus, during the emergency period, farmers accessed the majority of their seed for 
all four crops analyzed (maize, beans, sorghum, and cowpeas) by themselves. Across crops, a 
large portion of seed was sourced from local markets (not stockists specializing in certified seed). 
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In terms of the emergency phase, a question key to  aid agency’s heart  was posed : How many 
farmers relied on seed aid for 100% of the seed sown of a particular crop?  That is, would there 
have been farmers with no seed at all  of the particular ‘aid’ crop—in the absence of  outside 
intervention? Overall figures varied from 14% to 67% of farmers at each site. However, a closer 
analysis, by crop, showed that only ten farmers relied 100% on seed aid for their key crops—that 
is, those crops in which they themselves normally invest. (Table 3). For most farmers, seed aid 
supplied their full seed stock only if the crop were relatively new or of lower priority (as in the 
case of cowpea, sorghum, pigeon pea, or millet), or in the case of income-generating vegetables 
such as onion, kale, and tomato.  That is, during the emergency distribution,  the large majority of  
farmers found ways to get at least some seed on their own. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Farmers who relied on seed aid for 100% of the seed sown of a given crop,  
                  Long Rains 1997  
 
SITE 
 
MAKUENI 
(N=30) 
 
EMBU/MBEERE 
(N=33) 
 
MACHAKO
S 
(N=35) 
 
BARINGO 
(N=28) 
 
 
Staple crops 
 
  Versus 
 
More novel crops 
 
 
 3% 
 
 
 
63% 
  millet 
  cowpea 
  sorghum 
 
 
 
21%  
 
 
 
36%  
 millet 
 cowpea 
 sorghum 
 
 
 0%  
 
 
 
14%   
 sorghum 
 
 
 
 7%  
 
 
 
21%  
 income- 
generating 
 vegetables 
 
OVERALL:  8% for staple crops; 33% for novel crops 
 
 
Farmers'  normal crop and seed-procurement strategies were also a subject of inquiry---- to 
determine how ‘abnormal’ the practices were (or not) during the designated emergency. Farmers 
can normally use some seven potential channels for accessing seed.iii For maize, nearly all 
farmers regularly use home-saved maize seed as their main source , topping off seed stocks 
through purchase at  local markets. Use of stockist seed, that is, use of improved varieties and 
certified seed, is key only in the Baringo sample, although between one-quarter and a third of 
farmers in Machakos and Embu/Mbeere claim to use it ‘occasionally.’ Certified seed and hybrids 
are rarely used in Makueni. This overwhelming dependence on local maize seed perseveres in a 
context of vigorous and prolonged government efforts to promote hybrid and certified material. 
 
For beans, across sites, farmers use home-saved stocks as their central source for seed. However, 
local markets appear as an equally important source (Table 4). Given that bean seed can easily be 
selected out from the previous harvest (i.e., as it is self-pollinated), it is surprising how many 
farmers get bean seed off-farm every season or every other season (about 30% across the sites), 
with high amounts being acquired in this way (70% or more  of stocks). Most farmers get more 
than half their bean seed off-farm on a regular basis. 
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Table 4. Beans—farmers’ normal procurement sources for seed  
               (% farmers citing  source)* 
 
Source 
 
Makueni 
(N=20) 
 
Embu/Mbeere 
(N=20) 
 
Machakos 
(N=35) 
 
Baringo 
(N=22) 
 
Home saved 
 
100 
 
94 
 
77 
 
91 
 
Local market 
 
95 
 
83 
 
97 
 
86 
 
Stockist 
 
– 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
14 
 
Relatives 
 
10 
 
22 
 
 9 
 
5 (neighbors) 
 
Other 
 
 
 
 
 
Extension:  6 
Food Aid:  6  
 
 
* Note that farmers regularly access seed from several different sources during the same season 
 
For both maize and beans, the Kenyan data run counter to what is often taken as a truism when 
describing farmer seed systems: that is, that about 80% of the seed used by ‘normal farmers’ 
comes from their own stocks and, hence,  that accessing off-farm seed sources is ‘abnormal.’  
(e.g., Cooper, 1993)  The Kenyan material shows that small farmers routinely rely on local 
markets for a significant portion of their seed. 
 
Farmers overwhelmingly expressed dissatisfaction with their maize-procurement strategy, with 
the notable exception of Baringo where the ‘progressive’ sample accesses seed from stockists. 
The large majority can't afford certified seed (and find the prices exorbitant) and complain about 
the local market: the right varieties are not available, the seed is poor quality, merchants cheat on 
quantity, and the distances are too great. This widespread dissatisfaction seems relatively serious 
for a crop that forms the core of Kenyan agriculture. 
 
For bean-seed acquisition, farmer sentiment is also strong and clear across sites. The large 
majority find themselves heavily tied to the local market—spending money but not sure of the 
quality they are receiving. Because beans are self-pollinated, farmers generally regard bean seed 
as something they should not  have to buy, sparing  the money instead for school, medicine, and 
food. Overall, what does the ‘average’ farmer want in terms of bean seed? Self-sufficiency. She 
wants to save seed money, to save transport getting seed, and she wants the seed on time—all 
implying that home-saved seed is the way to go. 
 
Have seed (and seed-related) trends improved for maize and beans over the last decade? From the 
farmer perspective, apparently not. Prices have gone up, exchange networks have become 
weaker, and deteriorating soil fertility and fragmentation have meant smaller harvests. The few 
positive developments—some new varieties, the emergence of seed aid, the packaging of 
varieties in smaller , more affordable, packets—do little to counteract strong negative forces. 
 
In sum, in terms of an ‘external analysis’  there is no concrete evidence that seed aid, per se, has 
been strengthening farmer systems. Those who have received it once are not necessarily less 
likely to receive it again, and the amounts given have not been  significant in the context of 
farmers’ overall seed-procurement strategies. Further, the main crop given—hybrid maize—does 
not ensure that farmers can become less dependent on outside sources: it only performs in better, 
more fertile conditions, and has a built-in deterioration factor (that is, gradually losses its hybrid 
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vigor, if  seed is not renewed).. Considering that it only treats a symptom, and perhaps not in the 
most effective way, seed aid, as currently delivered, seems to be a rather costly intervention. 
 
 
WIDER REFLECTIONS: DIAGNOSIS OF SEED SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
When this  case analysis was first  commissioned , ‘the problem’ was presented as an acute one: 
Kenyan farmers had suffered from the effects of drought in the season prior to 1997 and needed 
critical seed to sow when rains next  fell. The consultancy was to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
seed-delivery program; that is, the internal process and products: were the right varieties given, 
were they given on time, and  were they given in an equitable manner.    
 
However, as the work unfolded, it became clear that the drought situation was not a once-off 
affair and was  not a discrete, acute disaster situation. For  some Kenyan farmers, the last decade 
has been one in which they have suffered droughts on a repeated basis. Between distinct and 
severe dry periods, their farming systems have been stable. Yet with sharp drops in rainfall, like 
those in 1991–92 and in 1996, they have required help from the outside—to get back to where 
they were. These farmers have been experiencing repeated acute stress.  
 
For many Kenyan farmers within the sample, however, the seed stresses they describe are neither 
acute nor repeated acute—they are there on a continual basis. Small plots (and harvests), 
unreliable rainfall, lack of adapted varieties, poorly adapted crops (like maize in many areas), 
distant markets, scarcity of cash to purchase seed—all hinder their being able to produce and/or 
access sufficient quantities of seed each season. While seed-and-tools treat their problems as 
acute, indeed their stress situation is a chronic one. 
 
The final section of this article explores further the conceptual distinctions between acute  and 
chronic seed insecure situations.  Building on the Seed Security Framework presented elsewhere 
in this volume (Remington et al, this volume), the piece concludes by distinguishing among the  
varied types of interventions to be contemplated in  different seed insecure contexts. The 
distinction between acute and chronic is first briefly explored below. It is then tied to the seed 
security framework elements of : seed access, seed availability, and utilization concerns.   
 
Acute versus Chronic Seed Insecurity 
Acute seed insecurity is brought on by distinct, short duration events that often affect a broad 
range of the population. It may be caused by the failure to plant a single season, loss of a harvest, 
or one-time loss of seed stocks in storage. While in ‘normal times’ we may find the seed secure, 
the semi secure, and the ‘always seed short’ households (i.e. chronically seed insecure), all may 
be affected during an acute event such as flood or short civil disturbance. Those communities and 
farmers who recover quickly, with or without one-off seeds-and-tools assistance, often are those 
who suffered only from acute stress. 
Chronic seed insecurity is independent of an acute stress or disaster, although it may be 
exacerbated by it. Chronic seed insecurity may be found among populations that have been 
marginalized in different ways: 
• Economically/socially marginal (poor, little land, little labor) 
• Ecologically marginal (e.g.. repeated drought, degraded land) 
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• Politically marginal (insecure areas, or on land with uncertain tenure 
arrangements) 
Chronically seed insecure populations may be characterized by: (1) continual shortage of 
adequate seed to plant than needed; 2) Difficulties in acquiring off-farm seed due to poverty  (3) 
the utilization of low quality seed and unwanted varieties on a routine basis. The result is 
households with a built-in vulnerability to seed system calamities. 
Acute and chronic seed insecurity are closely linked. More and more, we see a transition from 
acute to chronic seed insecurity rather than recovery as various forms of ‘quick relief’ (eg free 
distribution of improved varieties) serve to undermine the function of  local seed systems and  
alter more robust crop profiles (Sperling, 2000).  Relief interventions must both look for ways to 
increase seed security in chronically vulnerable areas and to assist communities to recover from 
acute disasters to prevent this slide into chronic seed insecurity. 
 
Seed Security Framework : Building in Acute versus Chronic distinctions 
 
The Seed Security framework (Remington, et al, this volume) distinguishes among the different  
types of constraints embodied in the concept of seed insecurity.  There may be concerns of  
availability, farmers’ access to seed  overall seed availability,  or actual seed utilization (that is, 
the genetic or seed quality appropriateness).  In the section below, we add still another layer to 
this framework reflecting on such constraints in the context of acute seed insecurity situations 
versus chronic seed insecurity situations.   
 
Each of the three boxes below reflects on a different constraint  (e.g. seed access)  in an acute 
versus  chronic seed insecurity situation, and the type of intervention which might be appropriate 
to lessen the stress. The purpose of the framework and the boxes is to link problem diagnosis with 
focused action.    
Box 1: Problem:  Access to Seed 
Acute Stress  Chronic Stress 
Farmers lack access to seed due such factors as  low 
purchasing power because of loss of  assets; erosion of 
social networks due to displacement; breakdown of trust 
(in conflict situations) reluctance of neighbours to help 
each other;  or an uncertain future (in conflict situations) 
preventing seed loans.   Desired seed is available locally, 
but they have no means to buy it or otherwise traditionally 
access it. 
Possible interventions: 
1. Vouchers which supports rather than undermine the 
local seed market and enable farmers to access 
current varieties.  
2. Cash grants.  
3. Focused effort to design interventions to avoid 
further damage to social relations: including careful 
design of targeting strategies and distribution 
systems to take account of social changes. 
Farmers lack of access to seed due such factors as 
poverty and its associated low purchasing power and 
smaller, more constricted social networks (which 
rountinely do not share). Desired seed is available 
locally, but they have no means to buy it or 
otherwise traditionally access it. 
Possible interventions: 
1. Income generation activities both on farm with 
cash crops and dual purpose crops or off-farm 
employment. 
2. Cash for work. 
3. Extensive community and local-level network 
building work. 
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Box 2: Problem: Seed Availability 
Acute Stress Chronic Stress 
Farmers lack seed  because of  an absolute lack of seed in 
an area to meet minimal needs, due, for example, damage 
to crops prior to harvest (eg by natural disaster), theft or 
unusual damage to household seed stocks. This absolute 
lack is often associated with a  spatial unavailability. Seed 
may be available regionally, but it cannot be transported 
because of transportation system breakdown,  marked 
insecurity, or a natural disaster.  It can also be  related to 
temporal unavailability where there is a sudden and 
dramatic increase in demand, especially for alternative 
crops or shorter duration varieties immediately after the 
disaster. 
Possible interventions: 
1. Importation of seed in large quantities to be sold 
unless purchasing power has also been identified as 
constraint. 
2. Importation of seed of acceptable varieties or crops 
and delivery to farmers in a timely fashion using 
alternative forms of transport. 
3. Seed fairs with cash sales/vouchers and seed 
company or trader input. 
 
 
Farmers lack seed to meet minimal needs due to such 
factors as small farm size, or low output (caused by labor 
shortage, pest/diseases, lack of inputs).  This absolute lack 
is usually due to spatial unavailability. Seed may be 
available in  the region, but non-functioning 
transportation systems or weak market infrastructure more 
generally  (e.g. traders' access to credit, sufficient storage 
facilities, pricing policies, etc. etc). can create continual 
shortages.  .   
Possible interventions: 
1. Development or enhancement of local seed 
production from small scale or micro enterprises 
built on existing local producers or newly-developed 
groups. The cost structure has to be kept only  
marginally above seed for grain while maintaining 
quality and variety integrity at levels ‘at least’ as 
good as what farmers regularly use. 
Production should focus on farmers’ or 
improved varieties or crops that are in demand by 
immediate producers and  consumers. 
2. Transport and sale of seed via diversified routes and 
multiple distribution points. Best to build on existing 
channels to keep cost low but this will not 
necessarily use the existing seed channels per se. 
Compare cost effectiveness of diverse channels, for 
example: merchants, nutritional centers, schools, 
Coca Cola trucks. It may be better to use routine 
conduits but expand their range of goods. Also test 
which outlets reach which types of 
farmers/consumers, wealth classes, and ethnic 
groups. 
3. Enhancement of decentralized information channels 
since the absence of a market information system  
may not allow prospective seed suppliers to respond 
to demand. 
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Box 3: Problem: Seed Utilization Concerns 
Acute Stress Chronic Stress 
Variety Adaptability 
Farmers lack adapted crops/varieties because sudden 
environmental stress: eg: drought/flood, 
Possible interventions: 
1. Seed ‘aid’ with a strong emphasize on the kind of 
crop and variety to be delivered. The crop or variety 
must be selected specifically to counteract 
‘emerging’ stress. 
2. Seed fairs with cash sales/vouchers and seed 
company or trader input which help circulate adapted 
varieties and seed. 
 
Seed Health and Physiological Quality 
Farmers seed, or seed available from market or others, is 
(unusually) of poor quality based –due to, for example, 
sudden/short-lived disease/pest occurrence.  
Possible Interventions: 
1. Seed treatments of farmers’ or local market seed 
2. Import of healthy seed or treated seed 
 
Variety Integrity 
Farmers varieties’ with appropriate purity and adaptation 
are not available/ accessible in the short term. 
Alternatively, improved varieties or alternative crops are 
not available/accessible to farmers so as to  maintain 
adequate levels of diversity and adaptation. 
Possible interventions: 
1. Vouchers or seed fairs with access to 
appropriate farmer and/or improved varieties or 
crops 
2. Other delivery systems which make 
available/accessible appropriate farmer or 
improved varieties.  (These might even be given 
in standard seed aid package) 
 
 
 
Variety Adaptability  
Farmers lack adapted crops/varieties which allow them to 
respond to longer-term changes in the cropping system. 
These may have become necessary because of: 
environment shifts(like warming), rise of disease and pest 
incidence, inappropriate  promotion of unadapted modern 
varieties (MVs),   or routine lack of access to inputs such 
as labor, cash, fertilizers, or pesticides. 
Possible interventions: 
1. Promotion of crops/varieties tolerant to the biotic 
and abiotic stress. This is often associated to shifts to 
early maturity variety or crops. 
2. Production of alternative crops,  such as legumes that 
are less labor intensive or need fewer inputs. A range 
of varieties should be promoted that will increase 
farmers options for adoption.  
3. Participatory plant breeding work which encourages 
farmers and formal breeders to work jointly to 
identify/develop adapted  and acceptable varieties 
Seed Health and Physiological Quality 
Farmers seed, or seed available from market or others,  
routinely is of poor quality (as assessed by farmers) or 
lacks vigor needed  for farmer-acceptable germination 
and establishment.   
Possible interventions: 
1. Reduction of post-harvest seed storage loss or 
deterioration with granaries or other forms of 
improved storage. 
2. Routine use of low cost seed dressings 
3. Analysis of existing seed handling and storage 
system with farmers to identify constraints to 
investigate alternative approaches 
4. Farmer (and possibly seed/grain trader) training on 
seed storage options and better handling of seed. 
Variety Integrity 
Farmers’ varieties, improved varieties or alternative crops 
with appropriate purity and adaptation are not available. 
Farmers cannot maintain adequate levels of diversity and 
adaptation in own saved seed or that from the  market. 
Possible interventions: 
1. Seed Fairs held routinely ( to promote distribution of 
both local and adapted improved varieties). 
2. Participatory testing of a range of cropsvarieties. 
3. Participatory plant breeding work which encourages 
farmers and formal breeders to work jointly to 
identify/develop adapted  and acceptable varieties 
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In conclusion, the aim of these frameworks is to develeop a focused strategy for addressing the 
continuum of acute and chronic seed  insecurity constraints plaguing small farmers in many 
regions of the world.  In light of this  range of constraints, giving ‘seed aid’, again and again, 
seems to be a relatively blunt response to what is indeed a more complex , but identifiable set of 
problems.  Tailoring an aid support response to specific seed system constraints should lead to  
shorter and longer-term beneficiary gains and  subsequently, also, to  significantly higher 
intervention cost-effectiveness-- for all concerned. 
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End notes 
                                                 
i The Kenyan case study,  which forms the body of this article, draws from 90-page report with the following reference :  L. Sperling.  
Emergency Seed Aid in Kenya: A Case Study of Lessons Learned. (August 2000) completed under a  United States Agency for 
International Development contract (#LAG-4111-00-3042-00).   
ii For many farmers, certified seed is just too expensive.  In addition, maize hybrids, that is, the genetic material, may not be adapted to 
their poorer soils and/or may require fertilizer inputs they simply cannot afford. 
iii Seed might be obtained from  the following sources: 
seed aid    given in emergency aid (from church, NGO or government 
home-saved         saved from the previous harvest and stored within the homestead 
local market    bought from open markets or local shops that stock grain and seed (often a  mix of both). Genetically,  this 
may include local varieties and improved  varieties that are circulated through markets (such as self-
pollinated beans,  OPV maize) 
stockist     procured from specialized input-supply shops that carry certified seed,  fertilizers, pesticides, etc. 
extensionist supplied by government agent who normally promotes varieties coming from  research and/or private sector 
relatives     given (usually as gifts) by close relatives 
other  a mixed bag of anything else that happens on an irregular basis: e.g.,  picked from abandoned field 
  
 
